We consider the choices available to a pension plan member at the time of retirement for conversion of his personal or defined contribution (DC) pension fund into a stream of income in retirement. In particular, we compare the purchase at retirement age of a conventional life annuity (that is, a bond-based investment) against a variety of programmes that involve differing exposures to equities during retirement. To make the comparison, we use stochastic modelling to evaluate the expected discounted utility associated with each programme as viewed by a policyholder on retirement.
Introduction
This paper examines the investment choices available to a defined contribution (DC) pension plan member at the time of his retirement. Should he convert his fund into an annuity? Should he continue to maintain some equity exposure? If so, is there an optimal mix between bonds and equities, and should he purchase some insurance against future very low equity returns?
Currently (as well as historically), most pension annuities sold are level life annuities that provide a fixed nominal income for the remaining life of the purchaser, and whose yield is related to that on long-term (fixed-interest) bonds (mainly Treasuries). 5 It is common, then, for members of DC plans to switch quite suddenly from an accumulation programme that typically has a very heavy weight in equities to a distribution programme that is almost entirely invested in bonds.
Recently commentators have begun to question whether it is sensible to have such a substantial bond-linked investment over such a long period. After all, the substantial improvements in longevity over the last century mean that retirees can expect to live for 15 years or more, and there are likely to be further improvements in longevity in the future. The issue of whether to rely so heavily on bond investments has also become more pressing in many countries following the substantial falls in bond yields over the last decade 6 . Naturally enough, the perceived poor value of traditional annuities has also motivated a search for new investment-linked retirement-income programmes (ILRIPs) that involve the provision of retirement income from a fund with a substantial equity component. The attraction of such vehicles is obviousthere are very few periods in history where equities do not outperform bonds over extended periods.
7 However, equity prices tend to be much more volatile than bond prices, so the higher expected returns from equities is gained at the cost of greater risk. In some countries there is a requirement to purchase an annuity by a given age 8 . In such cases an equity retirement investment has only a limited period to pay off.
Can we quantify the benefits and risks from ILRIPs in comparison with those from bond-based annuities? To answer this question, this paper presents some results for the discounted utilities generated by alternative retirement 5 More recently, however, it has become possible for annuity providers to sell indexlinked annuities (which link payments to increases in the retail prices index) as a result of the introduction of long-term index-linked government bonds that provide the essential matching assets for life offices. For more on index-linked bonds, see Anderson et al. (1996) .
6 For example, in the UK long-bond yields reached a forty-year low in 1999 pushing up annuity prices to corresponding highs.
7 Siegel (1997) shows that US equities generated higher average returns than US Treasury bonds and bills in 97% of all 30-year investment horizons since 1802. CSFB (2000) shows that similar results hold for the UK.
8 For example, in the UK, a life annuity has to be purchased by the age of 75. Most DC plan members take the conventional life annuity immediately on retirement, but richer retirees are in a position to delay the purchase.
programmes taking into account the investment-return and mortality risks they face. Our analysis is carried out on a real-terms annual basis, and takes as a benchmark the purchase of an index-linked annuity with the same cost.
Our simulation exercise produces a simulated distribution of discounted utility values for each programme considered, using a utility function that takes account of the policyholder's attitude to risk. We can then rank the different programmes according to their simulated mean values.
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the various distribution programmes available to a policyholder with a DC pension plan. Section 3 discusses the stochastic distribution model, section 4 presents and discusses the simulation results, and Section 5 concludes.
Alternative distribution programmes
In many countries, the principal retirement income vehicle in DC pension plans is the life annuity. This is the only financial instrument that protects the annuitant from outliving his resources: no other distribution programme will guarantee to make payments for however long an individual lives.
The accumulated pension fund is used to buy a life annuity from a life office. The amount of the annuity will depend on the size of the fund, the long-term bond yield on the purchase date, the type of annuity (that is, nominal or indexlinked), the age, sex and (occasionally) state of health of the annuitant, and a margin to cover the life office's profit and costs of marketing, administration, and investment management.
Annuities involve a range of risks for both the buyer and the seller. The plan member bears the risk of retiring when interest rates are low, so that the retirement annuity is permanently low. After he retires, he bears inflation risk if he purchases a level annuity: the risk of losses in the real value of his pension due to subsequent, unanticipated inflation. For their part, the insurance companies selling annuities face reinvestment risk (the risk of failing to match asset cashflows with expected liability outgo) and mortality risk (the risk that their pool of annuitants has lighter mortality than allowed for, e.g., because of an underestimate of mortality improvements 9 ). On the other hand, most alternatives to annuities involve a substantial investment exposure to equities. A higher level of equity exposure will give rise to a higher expected income than a conventional annuity, the income from which is based on the return on bonds. However, equity investments also involve higher charges and an increase in risk. In addition, some of these alternatives do not by themselves hedge mortality risk and so do not satisfy the basic requirement of a pension plan to provide an income in retirement for however long the plan member lives. To help achieve this requirement, we impose in our analysis the constraint that an index-linked annuity is purchased by the age of 75, the maximum permissible age for a pension annuity purchase in the UK.
In this paper we investigate a range of alternative distribution programmes for a male policyholder retiring at age 65. With the exception of the first programme below, each of these comes in two variants. In the first, the residual fund is paid as a bequest to the policyholder's estate if the policyholder dies before age 75: programmes with this feature are classified as income drawdown programmes. In the second, the residual fund reverts to the insurer, in return for which the insurer agrees to pay a mortality bonus at the start of each year provided the policyholder is still alive: programmes with this feature are classified as annuity programmes. We assume that the bonus fairly reflects the probability of death during the year and therefore the gain at the end of the year to the insurer if the policyholder dies.
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The distribution programmes considered are described in general terms below and in more detail in Section 3.3. The programmes we consider are based upon those known to exist already (for example, the flexible income programme) or are adaptations of typical unit-linked savings plans (for example, the derivative-backed programmes).
• Purchased life annuity: The policyholder transfers his retirement fund immediately on retirement at age 65 to the insurer in return for a fully index-linked pension. No bequest is payable at the time of death of the policyholder. Instead a mortality bonus is implicitly payable for the duration of the policy. This is the benchmark programme against which all the other programmes listed below are compared.
• Fixed income programme with a life annuity purchased at age 75: The policyholder transfers his retirement fund to a managed fund (which invests in a mixture of equities and bonds) when he retires at age 65. He then withdraws a fixed income each year equal to that he would have obtained had he purchased an annuity at age 65, assuming there are sufficient monies in his fund. At age 75, if he lives that long, he uses whatever fund remains to purchase a life annuity. This programme, however, involves the possibility that the fund will be exhausted before 75.
• Flexible income programme with a life annuity purchased at age 75: This programme prevents the policyholder running out of money before age 75, because, if the fund falls in value, the income received has to fall in tandem. The outcome is similar to that from the flexible unit-linked 10 This bonus acts to offset mortality drag, the extra return built into an annuity in comparison with other investments that arises from the mortality risk-sharing implicit in an annuity: those who die early on create a profit for the annuity provider which is shared in the form of a survival bonus with those annuitants who live longer than average. The mortality drag in any year is equal to the percentage of the initial group of annuitants who die in that year, and is therefore increasing in age. For more details, see Blake (1999) .
programme described below, and identical in the case where a mortality bonus is payable. We investigate four cases with different levels of equity exposure in the managed fund: 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%.
• Flexible income programme with a deferred life annuity purchased on retirement at age 65 and payable from age 75: The policyholder purchases a deferred life annuity at age 65 which will provide an income from age 75 equal to that payable at that age from an immediate annuity bought at age 65. He invests the remaining monies at age 65 in a managed fund. He then draws an income from the fund on the same basis as the flexible income programme above up to age 75 when the deferred annuity comes into payment. However, should he die before age 75, the value of the deferred annuity policy is lost.
• Unit-linked programme with a life annuity purchased at age 75: In this case the policyholder uses his retirement fund to purchase units in a managed fund at age 65. Where a mortality bonus is paid, the number of units received will depend on the latest forecasts of mortality available at the time of the payment. Each year a number of units are sold and the policyholder's income will change in line with changes in the price of these units. At age 75, assuming he lives that long, he uses the residual units to purchase a life annuity.
• Collared income programme with a life annuity purchased at age 75: This programme is similar to the flexible income programme above, but involves a smoothing out of investment returns. Instead of investing solely in a managed portfolio of equities, the fund invests in a mixed portfolio of equites and options to protect against downside equity risk. For each equity unit held, the portfolio is long one at-the-money put option and short one call option. The strike price of the call option is chosen so that the prices of the put and call options are equal. This means that the net cost of the resulting collar is zero 11 . As a result, we have 100% participation in equity returns subject to a cap and floor. The resulting smoothing of investment returns is similar in some respects to a with-profits policy, although in the present case the smoothing method is much more explicit.
• Floored income programme with a life annuity purchased at age 75: Like the collared income programme, this programme involves foregoing some upside potential to pay for downside protection. The policyholder is guaranteed to get a return of at least zero (that is, he holds an implicit at-the-money put option). He pays for this guarantee by selling off a proportion of the upside equity performance. He will therefore get some proportion (say, k 2 ) of the rise in the value of equities, with the difference of (1-k 2 ) being used to 'pay for' the put. This annual return structure 11 See Blake (2000a, Fig. 9.25) .
can also be achieved in a more simple way by investing in cash plus k 2 at-the-money call options. This programme is also sometimes known as a participating-equity or guaranteed-equity programme.
The distribution model
We illustrate the distribution model using the example of a typical 65-year old male policyholder who is assumed to have accumulated a personal pension fund on his retirement date (denoted time 0) of F (0) = £100, 000. Our policyholder has to choose between an index-linked annuity and one of our 7 ILRIPs. Each of these ILRIPs in turn has two alternative versions, income drawdown and annuity:
(A) In the case of income drawdown, if the policyholder dies between t and t + 1, the residual fund, F (t + 1), at the end of the year of death will be paid to the estate of the policyholder in the form of a bequest.
(B) In the case of an annuity, no bequest is paid to the policyholder's estate. Instead, the fund reverts to the insurer if the policyholder dies between t and t + 1. In return, the insurer pays a mortality bonus, B(t), into the policyholder's fund at the start of every year if the policyholder is still alive (that is, the fund is increased from F (t) to F (t) + B(t) at time t if the policyholder is still alive at that time). The fair bonus at time t is B(t) = [F(t) − P(t)]q x+t /p x+t , where P (t) is the pension payable at time t, x is the age at retirement, q x+t is the probability of death before age x + t + 1 given that the policyholder is alive at age x + t, and p x+t = 1 − q x+t is the corresponding survival probability.
In the models discussed below, δ = 1 indicates that a bequest is payable, δ = 0 indicates that mortality bonuses are payable, and D(t + 1) represents the bequest payable at t + 1 if the policyholder dies between times t and t + 1.
Asset returns
We assume that there are two assets: risk-free bonds and equity. The bond fund, M (t), grows at the continuously compounded constant real risk-free rate of r per annum, so that at time t, M (t) = M(0) exp(rt), where M (0) is the opening balance. Equity units, S(t), constitute a risky investment which follows the log-normal or geometric Brownian motion model, so that S(t) = S(0) exp(µt+σZ(t)), where S(0) is the opening balance and Z(t) is a standard Brownian motion. We work on an annual basis throughout. It follows that the annual gross real return on equities is log-normal with mean exp(µ + 1 2 σ 2 ) and variance exp(2µ + σ 2 )[exp(σ 2 ) − 1]. For simplicity, we assume that pension income is drawn at the start of each year and that pension plan assets are rebalanced annually to maintain predetermined proportions in each asset. These assumptions do not affect the largely qualititative conclusions later in the paper.
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We assume that the annual life office charge on equity investment for all distribution programmes is constant at 1% of fund value, implying a reduction in yield of 1%. Income drawdown is actually a very expensive product, with charges in the UK currently much higher than the 1% we have allowed for.
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Nevertheless, to preserve comparability, we assume a 1% charge for income drawdown as well.
In our simulations, we used the following parameters: This implies that the expected gross real return on equities is 1.09 and the standard deviation of the total real return is 0.27. These parameter values are based on the historical distribution of returns on UK Treasury bills and equities and include the 1% reduction in yield on equity returns 14 . The inflation assumption is required for programmes 6 and 7 below.
Mortality and financial functions
We make use of the following mortality and financial functions:
• q x and p x are the year-on-year mortality and survival probabilities respectively 15 . The values of these probabilities are the same as those used in the most appropriate UK mortality table (that is, PMA92Base: see McCutcheon et al. (1998 McCutcheon et al. ( , 1999 ).
• t p x = p x × . . .×p x+t−1 is the probability that the pensioner survives from retirement at age x to age x + t.
• t |q x = t p x − t+1 p x is the probability that the pensioner will die between ages x + t and x + t + 1 given that he is alive at age x.
•ä y = ∞ t=0 t p y e −rt is the price at age y of an index-linked single-life life annuity of £1 per annum, payable annually in advance. 12 We have not considered the potential aggregate impact on the dynamics of S(t) of a large-scale shift in pension-plan asset allocation. Instead we assume that pension provision is already in some steady state.
13 See Appendix A, Blake, Cairns & Dowd (2000) . 14 See Blake, Cairns and Dowd (2001) . 15 Thus, p x is the probability that an individual aged x survives for one year, and q x = 1 − p x is the corresponding probability of death.
• s |ä y = ∞ t=s t p y e −rt is the price at age y of an index-linked, deferred single-life life annuity paying £1 per annum from age y + s.
•ä y:n = n−1 t=0 t p y e −rt is the price at age y of a temporary, index-linked single-life annuity for n years of £1 per annum payable annually in advance.
In places, we will generalise this notation to indicate the current time s (for example, t p x (s) is the estimated t-year survival probability at time s based upon information available up to time s,ä y (s) is the estimated cost of a £1 annuity to an individual aged y at time s based upon information available up to time s, etc.). This allows us to incorporate the effects of changes in the mortality basis used by the life office over time (for example, due to improvements in mortality not anticipated in the original basis). From the formulae given in the next section, it can be seen that the effects of unanticipated improvements in mortality are easy to incorporate. In the simulations, however, we will assume that there are no changes in the assumed mortality basis. 
Distribution programmes
In what follows the quantities P (t), F (t), B(t) and D(t) are all assumed to be expressed in real (that is, relative to the retail prices index (RPI)) units. This avoids the need to deal with the effects of changes in the RPI on pension incomes.
We do not consider explicitly income deriving from other sources such as personal savings. In some countries, pension income accounts for a very high proportion of the total resources available to most people after retirement: for example, in the UK, state and private pensions represent 86% of the total income of a typical retired person in 1997-98 (Department of Social Security (2000, Table 1)). In other countries (for example, the USA) personal savings (that is, savings not explicitly pension related) are quite significant for large segments of the population. However, in the context of the present paper, any non-pensions-related personal savings can be treated straightforwardly by adding them to the pension fund at retirement.
17 There is, additionally, the issue of the individual's residence. Where, for example, the individual is the outright owner of his main residence we treat this as a fixed asset which becomes a bequest on death. This bequest is the same under all of the programmes described below and so has no differential effect. The value function defined in Section 4 is assumed, implicitly, to have incorporated this fixed bequest. Finally we assume the pensioner consumes all his pension income each year.
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We now list the different programmes and explain their main features.
Programme 1: Purchased life annuity (PLA)
F (0) is used immediately to purchase an index-linked life annuity at a price of a x per £1 of pension (where the rate of interest applied toä x is the real riskfree rate, r, available in the market). The pension is therefore P (t) = F (0)/ä x for t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. and is payable until death. No bequest is payable, but the policyholder receives implicit mortality bonuses instead.
Programme 2: Fixed income programme (FIX)
Programme 2 assumes that the initial retirement fund F (0) is invested entirely in equities until age 75, and for as long as possible generates the same fixed pension for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . as Programme 1. Hence for t = 0, 1, . . . , 9:
Programme 2A (⇒ δ = 1) is the income drawdown variant that pays a bequest of the residual fund to the policyholder's estate if death occurs before age 75. Programme 2B (⇒ δ = 0) is the annuity variant that pays mortality bonuses at times 0 to 9. If the policyholder is still alive at time t = 10 (age 75), the residual fund, F (10), is used to purchase an index-linked life annuity. Thus, for t = 10, 11, . . ., P (t) = F(10)/ä x+10 (10). From the age of 75 on, the policyholder receives implicit mortality bonuses and there is no longer any possibility of a bequest.
However, we should note that in the case of the income drawdown variant, it is possible that poor investment performance might lead F (t) (and, therefore, P (t)) to fall to zero before time 10. Indeed, this actually happened in about 20% of our simulations. In practice government regulations on income drawdown generally prohibit such an eventuality by requiring the pension to be reduced if there was a catastrophic fall in the value of the fund.
Programme 3: Flexible income programme (FLX)
Programme 3 is designed to rectify the principal shortcoming of Programme 2, namely the possibility of running out of funds before age 75. Under this 18 A simple alternative that would not change the quantitative results would be to assume that an unconsumed pension is reinvested in the same assets as the pension fund.
programme, the pension is adjusted each year to reflect both the fund size available at the beginning of the year and policyholders' latest mortality prospects. The procedure for calculating each year's pension payment ensures that P (t) and F (t) are always positive. This programme also allows for greater flexibility in the investment strategy by varying the weighting (ω) of the managed equity fund and the corresponding weighting (1 − ω) in bonds. As before, there is an income drawdown variant that allows for bequests (Programme 3A ⇒ δ = 1) and an annuity variant that awards mortality bonuses (Programme 3B ⇒ δ = 0).
Hence, for t = 0, 1, . . . , 9:
At time t = 10 (age 75), if the policyholder is still alive, the residual fund, F (10), is used to purchase an index-linked life annuity. Thus, for t = 10, 11, . . ., P (t) = F (10)/ä x+10 (10). As in Programme 1, no bequests are payable after time 10, and the policyholder receives mortality bonuses instead. If a bequest is payable then this programme will provide a level pension in real terms if the return on the assets is equal to the risk-free rate plus the mortality drag: that is, if
This is in contrast with Programme 5A, described below, where assets are required to generate a return equal to the risk-free rate to provide a level pension in real terms. If the return on the fund exceeds this quantity, the pension will grow over time.
Programme 4: Flexible income programme with a deferred life annuity (DEF)
Under this programme, part of the fund is used at time 0 to purchase a deferred index-linked life annuity to start from age 75 with a deferred pension equal to that under Programme 1. Thus P (t) = P (0) (in real terms) for t = 10, 11, . . .. The cost of the deferred annuity is P (0) × 10 |ä x = (F (0) × 10 |ä x )/ä x , and is deducted from the initial fund, so that:
For t = 1, 2, . . . , 9:
Equation (3.3.10) indicates that the pension drawn at time t is the same pension we would get if F (t) was used to purchase an index-linked annuity payable from t for 10 − t years. Sinceä x+9:1 (9) = 1 we have P (9) = F (9) and F (10) = 0, so there is no residual fund at time 10 to top up the deferred pension purchased at time 0. However, the programme might perform better than Programme 1 for the first 10 years. Finally, as before, Programme 4 allows for either bequests (Programme 4A ⇒ δ = 1) or mortality bonuses (Programme 4B ⇒ δ = 0).
Programme 5: Unit-linked programme (UNI)
This programme allocates the policyholder a set of equity units U (0) at time 0. For t = 0, 1, . . . , 9, u t units are cashed in to provide the pension (that is, P (t) = u t S(t), where the price of one equity unit at time t is S(t), with S(0) = 1). At time 10, the remaining u 10 units are used to purchase an index-linked life annuity, so u 10 = e −10rä x+10 u 0 and P (t) = u 10 S(10)/ä x+10 for t = 10, 11, . . ..
First consider Programme 5A (δ = 1), the income-drawdown variant. We let U (t) represent the number of units remaining at time t. Thus, U (0) = F (0) (given S(0) = 1) and U (t + 1) = U(t) − u t . Our objective in this case is that the units should be cashed in in such a way as to produce a level pension in real terms if (a) units grow in line with the risk-free rate of interest and (b) the life-office mortality assumptions remain unchanged. It follows that the number of units cashed in at time t will be:
Programme 5A produces different results from Programme 3A (100% equities). First, the initial pension under 5A is lower. Second, the condition needed to generate a level pension in real terms under 5A is that asset returns equal the risk-free return, not exceed it by a factor of 1/p x+t (t) as with Programme 3A (see Equation 3.3.9). This means that the pension drawn under Programme 5A will increase at a faster rate than that under Programme 3A given that both programmes are subject to identical rates of investment returns.
Programme 5B (δ = 0) is the annuity variant that involves mortality bonuses, with uncashed units on death reverting to the insurer. Again, let U (t) be the number of units held at time t. The mortality bonus appears in the form of units, b(t) (rather than amounts), payable at times t = 0, 1, . . . , 9. The number of units cashed in at time t will be:
u 10 = U (10)
and
As with Programme 5A, it can be shown that if (a) units grow in line with the risk-free rate of interest and (b) the life-office mortality assumptions remain unchanged then the programme will deliver a level pension in real terms. However, since there is no bequest this level pension will be higher than that under 5A.
It is straightforward to show (algebraically) that Programme 5B produces identical pension payments to those of Programme 3B under stochastic simulation of the equity price S(t) (assuming the same equity weights in the managed fund).
Programme 6: Collared income programme (COL)
This programme (again involving either bequests (Programme 6A ⇒ δ = 1) or mortality bonuses (Programme 6B ⇒ δ = 0)) is identical to Programme 3 except that the investment returns are subject to a collar -a floor and a cap created by a simple combination of put and call options on the fund assets.
For simplicity, we will assume that the managed fund is 100% equityinvested. LetS(t) be the nominal value of the equity units. We denote the collared unit value of the fund in nominal terms byS(t) = S(t) exp(πt) with S(0) = 1 and, for t = 1, . . . , 10:
For each investment of £1 at time t − 1 this return can be replicated by the purchase of 1/S(t−1) units of the underlying equity, the purchase of 1/S(t−1) 1-year put options with a strike price of k 0S (t − 1) per put option, and the sale of 1/S(t − 1) 1-year call options with a strike price of k 1S (t − 1) per call option. Given k 0 , k 1 is chosen to ensure that the prices of the put and call options are equal, so that the total cost of this portfolio at time t − 1 is equal to £1. In this exercise we have chosen k 0 = 1.
The Black-Scholes price (which requires us to work in nominal rather than real terms) for the relevant put option is:
is the cumulative normal distribution function, π is the assumed constant rate of inflation, and r + π is the nominal risk-free rate of interest. The price of the relevant call option is:
where d 1 (k) and d 2 (k) are defined above. We choose k 1 so that C(k 1 ) = P (k 0 ). With k 0 = 1, r = 0.01, π = 0.05 and σ = 0.244 we find that k 1 = 1.1403. Since π = 0.05, the collared unit value cannot fall in nominal terms but it can fall by up to 5%, approximately, in real terms. Having established k 0 and k 1 , we can revert to working in real terms. Thus the gross real return on the fund from t − 1 to t is:
Programme 7: Floored income programme (FLR)
The final programme that we consider (again involving either bequests (Programme 7A ⇒ δ = 1) or mortality bonuses (Programme 7B ⇒ δ = 0)) is identical to Programme 3 except that allocated investment returns are subject to a floor using a put option on the fund assets financed by the policyholder foregoing a proportion of equity returns above the minimum set by the strike price on the put. Again for illustrative purposes, we assume that the managed fund is 100% equity-invested. The allocated investment returns are determined as follows for t = 1, . . . , 10 (where we define the unit value of the fund in nominal terms byŜ(t) with
That is, the payoff can be described equally well in terms of a combination of cash, put and call options (equation (3.3.13)) or cash and call options (equation (3.3.12)). The real return on the fund from t − 1 to t is therefore:
Given k 0 , k 2 is chosen to ensure that the cost of the put option is offset exactly by the sale of (1 − k 2 ) call options with the same strike price (this also requires k 0 < e r+π ). This means that k 2 = (1 − k 0 e −r−π )/C(k 0 ) where C(k) is defined in Equation (3.3.11). In this example we have chosen k 0 = 1 in nominal terms, which gives us a value for k 2 of 0.4614.
Simulation output

The value function
To compare these programmes, we generated a large number of simulated outcomes and from these derived simulated distributions for the policyholder's discounted lifetime utility, conditional on the assumptions made. This notion of utility captures the policyholder's welfare throughout retirement and is similar to that employed by Merton (1990) and others.
We measure value relative to the standard annuity pension which pays the fixed amount of P B = F (0)/ä 65 (0) per annum for life with no bequest (Programme 1). We refer to this annuity as the benchmark pension. For the given parameters and mortality rates and for an initial fund of £100,000, P B = £6326.13.
The policyholder's discounted utility takes one of the following forms:
where
The parameter φ determines how strongly the policyholder favours the existence of a bequest, while J 2 (D(t)) measures the relative weight attached to different sizes of bequest.
19 Note that J 2 (·) has been formulated so that any positive bequest increases the value function relative the benchmark pension which involves no bequest. The parameters φ and γ 2 will reflect the family characteristics of the policyholder: for example, a married man with young children is likely to have a greater bequest motive and hence higher values of φ and γ 2 than a single man with no children. We should note that the value function for δ = 0 (4.1.1) is a special case of that for δ = 1 (4.1.2) since δ = 0 implies that J 2 (·) ≡ 0 for all t.
In each case 65 + K is the (rounded down) age of the policyholder at death. The discount rate β reflects his rate of time preference, and the form of J 1 (·) and J 2 (·) reflects his attitudes to risk. The optimal ILRIP is then that which maximises the expected value of V .
For this exercise we assume that J 1 (·) and J 2 (·) are negative exponential utility functions. In J 1 (·) and J 2 (·), γ 1 and γ 2 are absolute risk aversion parameters. These utility functions ensure that the random value function is constant and equal to 0 for the benchmark pension, regardless of the date of death. It also reduces the impact of mortality risk on V .
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It is often more helpful to work with a measure of relative risk aversion. However, so far as the authors are aware, while a standard definition of relative risk aversion exists for a single cashflow, there is no corresponding definition for the value placed on a series of cashflows. We therefore propose the following definition. Consider the case where P (t) = P is constant and no bequest is payable. Then the value function is a function of P only: V (P ). We define the relative risk aversion coefficient to be −P.V (P )/V (P ) and the values quoted below are evaluated at the benchmark P = P B . For the value functions in Equations (4.1.1) and (4.1.2) the relative risk aversion coefficient is therefore 19 There are two components to the undiscounted value of the bequest. The parameter φ determines the maximum value attached to arbitrarily large bequests and should be related to the maximum value (approximately the expected number of years from retirement until death) attached to very large pension payments. The parameter γ 2 is a parameter which determines the rate at which the value approaches the maximum.
20 Mortality risk is a source of randomness which the policyholder cannot control. We choose the form of V in such a way that the same value (zero) is attached to the benchmark pension regardless of the date of death. It follows that for other programmes the randomness we observe in V is primarily a result of uncertainty in future investment returns. This source of uncertainty is controllable by the policyholder. The removal of the effect of mortality risk helps us to focus on this investment risk. γ 1 P B at the benchmark and is an increasing function of the pension received in excess of the benchmark.
General comments on the results
In the following simulations we have assumed that γ 1 = γ 2 = γ and that φ = 1 (Equations (4.1.1) and (4.1.2)).
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We conducted the stochastic simulations across a range of values for the relative risk aversion coefficient, γP B , varying from 0.5 to 50. This range embraces both very risk-averse and risk-loving behaviour by policyholders. In addition, we fixed the value of β at 0.03, which corresponds to the marginal rate of time preference of a typical UK household (see Blake (2000b) ).
Simulation results are presented in Table 1 for the discounted utilities of the different ILRIPs when the relative risk aversion coefficient, γP B is 5 (which corresponds to a middle-of-the-range value for private investors).
The values in Table 1 were derived by carrying out 2,000 independent simulations of the equity return process, with the levels of pension and death benefit calculated for each simulation. Mortality is assumed to be independent of the investment scenario, and we considered 45 alternative mortality scenarios corresponding to the policyholder's last birthday alive being 65, 66, etc. up to 109 22 . Each of the resulting 90,000 combined investment/mortality scenarios has its own discounted utility and we can use our simulation results to estimate the distribution of the policyholder's discounted utility, as viewed from the date of his retirement. This distribution allows us to estimate not just the mean (the basis of our decision rule) but also the standard deviation of his discounted utility, and various percentiles (we define these as measuring his utility-at-risk (UtaR)).
Perhaps the most obvious way to evaluate the alternative programmes is by comparing their simulated mean discounted utilities. If we were to choose the policy with the highest mean discounted utility, we would choose Programme 3B (the flexible income annuity paying mortality bonuses, with 25% equities). 21 Note that it is, of course, not necessary that we set γ 1 = γ 2 . 22 The weight attached to each scenario was taken to be the product of 1 / 2000 and the probability of death at the relevant age. • The best programmes are 3B, with 100% equities, and 5B if relative risk aversion, γP B , is less than about 1. Programme 3B remains optimal for relative risk aversion parameters up to about 10, provided the equity proportion within it gradually falls from 100% down to 0% as the degree of relative risk aversion increases. For more risk averse policyholders, the purchased life annuity (Programme 1) is optimal.
These results are, of course, not surprising. What is novel in this study is the finding that some individuals definitely prefer 100% equities, while others prefer the purchased life annuity (PLA) and also how rapidly (in terms of γP B ) we switch between these extremes.
• For φ = 1, all the optimal policies use mortality bonuses rather than bequests. We investigate below how robust this conclusion is to changes in the value of φ. Relative risk aversion factor (log scale) Figure 4 .2.1: Mean discounted utility for a range of investment-linked retirement income programmes against relative risk aversion: (a) annuity programmes paying mortality bonuses, (b) income drawdown programmes paying bequests. Exponential utility, standard mortality, φ = 1, γ 1 = γ 2 .
• All the optimal policies employ simple mixes of equities and bonds rather than more sophisticated strategies involving derivatives or deferred annuities (that is, Programmes 4B, 6B and 7B lie strictly below the optimal programme for all levels of relative risk aversion).
For any specific value of γP B , Figure 4 .2.1 can be used to rank the programmes in order of preference, and Table 1 does this for a relative risk aversion coefficient of γP B = 5. However, the differences in discounted expected utilities give us no feel for how much worse Programme 6A, say, is compared with Programme 3B when γP B = 5.
It would therefore be useful to know the answer to the following question: how much extra cash would a policyholder need at time 0 in order for Programme 6A to have the same expected discounted utility as the optimal Programme 3B with F (0) = £100, 000 and 25% equities? This question is answered in Figure 4 .2.2: we would require an extra 15% approximately (Figure 4 .2.2(b)) or £15,000 for Programme 6A to match Programme 3B for an investor with a relative risk aversion coefficient of γP B = 5. Figure 4 .2.2 is much more informative than Figure 4 .2.1 because it gives a much better impression of the relative quality of each programme. For example, we can now see that for policyholders with a relatively strong appetite for risk (low values of γP B ), some programmes would require as much as 50% or 60% extra cash (Programmes 1 and 6A) to match the optimal Programme 3B (25% equities). This finding should not be surprising: programmes with derivatives or lower proportions of equities do badly because they have lower expected returns (important when γP B is low) as well as lower risk (not important to an investor with a low degree of relative risk aversion).
At the other end of the spectrum, Figure 4 .2.2 shows that a very riskaverse policyholder must opt for Programme 1, as all other programmes require significant additional amounts of cash at time 0 (typically 10% to 30%) to give them the same expected discounted utility. Programme 2 is particularly unattractive: it moves rapidly off the scale in Figure 4 .2.2, reflecting the severe penalty that a very risk averse policyholder attaches to the danger of running out of money. • Programme 1 has a degenerate distribution because the choice of utility function completely removes the effect of mortality risk.
• Figure 4 .2.3(a) uses Programme 3B for illustration and shows that greater equity investment results in a greater spread of values for V . The 25% equity investment strategy generates the highest mean V and also the second lowest UtaR at the 20% confidence level (see also • Figure 4 .2.3(b) uses Programmes 3A and B to show that programmes offering mortality bonuses appear to have first-order stochastic dominance over those involving bequests (at least for the value of φ chosen).
• Figure 4 .2.3(c) compares some low-risk annuity programmes. Of particular interest is the closeness between 3B (flexible income annuity with 25% equity invested), 6B (collared income annuity) and 7B (floored income annuity), and the fact that 3B consistently dominates 6B.
• Finally (Figure 4 .2.4), we compared the fixed and flexible income annuity Programmes 2B and 3B on the assumption that both are 100% equity invested. This reveals that the restraint on the amount of pension drawn under 3B is very beneficial for policyholders with this type of utility function as it prevents the discounted utility becoming minus infinity. Figure 4 .3.1: Sensitivity to the weight attached to the bequest. Extra cash required at time 0 to match the optimal discounted utility as a function of the relative risk aversion parameter: income drawdown programmes paying bequests. Exponential utility, standard mortality, φ = 2, γ 1 = γ 2 .
Importance of the bequest
The relative importance of the bequest was investigated by varying the parameter φ in Equation , we see that the change in φ has only a small effect on the outcome. Typically the mean utility (not plotted) rises by less than 0.2: the change in φ multiplied by the probability that a bequest will be paid before the fund is annuitized at age 75. It follows that for the programmes with a bequest will only become optimal if (a) the parameter φ is increased substantially and (b) the requirement to annuitize at age 75 is removed.
Adverse mortality selection
All calculations in the preceeding sections have assumed that the policyholder's mortality probabilities equal those used by the insurer to calculate annuity prices. However, a typical group of policyholders will include some in good health and others in poor health. For the latter, the purchase of a life annuity at retirement at standard rates represents poor value. It is often suggested, therefore, that those in poor health should choose to defer annuitization for as long as possible.
We considered an individual for whom mortality rates are 2.5 times that assumed by the life office (that is, q actual x = min{2.5q PLA x , 1}). This factor is consistent with, for example, an individual who has just been diagnosed as suffering from Alzheimer's Disease (Macdonald & Pritchard (2000) ). 2 (for example, optimal expected discounted utility is lower). However, for the range of programmes on offer to the policyholder, the optimal choices for different levels of risk aversion are basically the same as for a standard life. Programmes paying a bequest (not plotted) are still suboptimal.
It is possible that such an impaired life would benefit more from programmes which allowed for accelerated payment of pension. However, the most substantial benefit to the policyholder still accrues from higher mortality bonuses from the insurer to reflect the higher mortality rates (as is the case with impaired life annuities) rather than from a programme with bequests. 
Power utility
It is useful to investigate to what extent the optimal selection of a programme depends upon the choice of utility function. As an alternative to the exponential utility function we considered power utility which gives constant relative risk aversion. Figure 4 .2.1. However, closer inspection indicates that for each relative risk aversion coefficient the optimal choice of programme is almost always the same as that with exponential utility. To be more precise, the values for the relative risk aversion coefficient at which we switch from, say, Programme 3B 100% to 75% are close although not identical. Furthermore, a comparison of Figures 4.5.2 and 4.2.2 (which are rather more similar in shape) tells us that incorrect use of the exponential-utility-based optimum rather than correct use of the power-utility-based optimum (that is, assuming that the policyholder actually has power utility) would cost the policyholder at most around 2% of his initial fund.
These findings appear to indicate that what is critical in determining the policyholder's optimal programme is the local value of the relative risk aversion coefficient. Additional information concerning the overall shape of the policyholder's utility function is not helpful in refining this decision. 
Conclusions
Evaluating pension plan design was always important, but is becoming even more so as the move towards DC plans gathers pace. We hope that we have demonstrated that this remark is at least as valid for the distribution phase as it is for the accumulation phase of a DC plan. Our results suggest that the best programme pays a mortality bonus to the policyholder in return for which the residual fund reverts to the pension provider on the policyholder's death. The best programme is therefore an annuity programme rather than an income drawdown programme that leaves a bequest to the policyholder's survivors. The best programme also depends on the policyholder's attitude to risk: if he is highly risk averse, the appropriate programme is a conventional life annuity; on the other hand, if he is more risk loving, the best programme involves a mixture of bonds and equities, with the optimal mix depending on the policyholder's degree of risk aversion. In particular, the best programme does not involve a derivatives position to provide downside protection.
There are a number of key implications arising from our findings. First, the optimal choice appears to be fairly insensitive to the weight attached by the policyholder to the bequest. In particular, the weight would have to be substantially higher than that used in the paper to make programmes with a bequest optimal. Second, policyholders in very poor health relative to the average should nevertheless choose very similar programmes to policyholders with the same degree of relative risk aversion but in normal health (that is, programmes which pay mortality bonuses based upon normal mortality rates and with a similar, or even the same, asset mix). Third, the optimal choice of programme is not overly sensitive to the choice of utility function.
Three extentions naturally suggest themselves:
• We have assumed in this paper that the annuities associated with the income drawdown programmes are purchased at age 75, consistent with the maximum possible age under UK law. However, it would be useful to investigate the optimal age to switch to an annuity, particularly since Milevsky (1998) has recently argued on the basis of Canadian data that the optimal switching age might be later than 75. We plan to investigate this issue further in a later paper.
• We are also aware that our analysis disregards the important issue of mortality improvements. This issue raises deeper questions than we can address here, and clearly warrants much further research. One promising avenue is to investigate flexible unit-linked programmes where the income received falls as mortality improves. We also leave this issue for further research.
• We have considered here the optimal choice for a policyholder from the limited range of standard programmes that providers of retirement income products currently offer. Future work would investigate optimal solutions based on stochastic dynamic programming. The aim would be to measure the additional utility gains from full optimisation over the standard programmes considered here.
